In the app releasing process, Android requires all apps to be digitally signed with a certificate before distribution. Android uses this certificate to identify the author and ensure the integrity of an app. However, a number of signature issues have been reported recently, threatening the security and privacy of Android apps. In this paper, we present the first large-scale systematic measurement study on issues related to Android app signatures. We first create a taxonomy covering four types of app signing issues (21 anti-patterns in total), including vulnerabilities, potential attacks, release bugs and compatibility issues. Then we developed an automated tool to characterize signature-related issues in over 5 million app items (3 million distinct apks) crawled from Google Play and 24 alternative Android app markets. Our empirical findings suggested that although Google has introduced apk-level signing schemes (V2 and V3) to overcome some of the known security issues, more than 93% of the apps still use only the JAR signing schemes (V1), which poses great security threats. Besides, we also revealed that 7% to 45% of the apps in the 25 studied markets have been found containing at least one signing issue, while a large number of apps have been exposed to security vulnerabilities, attacks and compatibility issues. Among them a considerable number of apps we identified are popular apps with millions of downloads. Finally, our evolution analysis suggested that most of the issues were not mitigated after considerable amounts of time across markets. The results demonstrate the emergency for detecting and repairing app signing issues.
Tue 12 NovDisplayed time zone: Tijuana, Baja California change
16:00 - 17:40 | SecurityDemonstrations / Research Papers / Journal First Presentations at Hillcrest Chair(s): Julia Rubin University of British Columbia | ||
16:00 20mTalk | Performance-Boosting Sparsification of the IFDS Algorithm with Applications to Taint AnalysisACM SIGSOFT Distinguished Paper Award Research Papers Dongjie He University of New South Wales; Institute of Computing Technology, CAS; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Haofeng Li Institute of Computing Technology, CAS; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Lei Wang Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Science, Haining Meng Institute of Computing Technology, CAS; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Hengjie Zheng Institute of Computing Technology, CAS; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Jie Liu University of New South Wales, Shuangwei Hu vivo AI Lab, Lian Li Institute of Computing Technology at Chinese Academy of Sciences, China, Jingling Xue UNSW Sydney | ||
16:20 20mTalk | Characterizing Android App Signing Issues Research Papers Haoyu Wang Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, China, Hongxuan Liu Peking University, Xusheng Xiao Case Western Reserve University, Guozhu Meng Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Yao Guo Peking University | ||
16:40 20mTalk | OAuthLint: An Empirical Study on OAuth Bugs in Android Applications Research Papers Tamjid Al Rahat University of Virginia, Yu Feng University of California, Santa Barbara, Yuan Tian University of Virginia Pre-print | ||
17:00 20mTalk | Are Free Android App Security Analysis Tools Effective in Detecting Known Vulnerabilities? Journal First Presentations Link to publication DOI Pre-print Media Attached | ||
17:20 10mDemonstration | SWAN_ASSIST: Semi-Automated Detection of Code-Specific, Security-Relevant Methods Demonstrations Goran Piskachev Fraunhofer IEM, Lisa Nguyen Quang Do Google, Oshando Johnson Fraunhofer IEM, Eric Bodden Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Paderborn University and Fraunhofer IEM Pre-print Media Attached File Attached | ||
17:30 10mDemonstration | Sip4J: Statically Inferring Access Permission Contracts for Parallelising Sequential Java Programs Demonstrations Ayesha Sadiq Monash University, Li Li Monash University, Australia, Yuan-Fang Li Monash University, Ijaz Ahmed University of Lahore, Sea Ling Monash University |